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TOWARD A POLICY OF DESTRUCTION 
BUFFALOES, LAW, AND THE MARKET, 1803,83 
ANDREW ISENBERG 
When the United States purchased the Lou-
isiana Territory from France in 1803, it acquired 
an abundance of natural resources that would 
help fuel American economic expansion for the 
rest of the nineteenth century. The fertile soil 
of the tallgrass prairie would support one of the 
most productive agricultural regimes in the 
United States. Lumberers would cut longleaf, 
shortleaf, loblolly, and slash pine from the west 
bank of the Mississippi River between New Or-
leans and St. Louis. Miners would discover de-
posits of gold and lead in Colorado, Montana, 
and South Dakota.! Yet the most prominent 
resource of the Louisiana Territory in the nine-
teenth century was located in the semiarid 
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shortgrass Plains west of the hundredth merid-
ian. The 30 million buffaloes found on the High 
Plains in 1803 would prompt one western his-
torian to call the acquisition of the Louisiana 
Territory, "the single largest purchase of live-
stock in history. "Z Yet eighty years after the Lou-
isiana Purchase, the bison of the Great Plains 
had been nearly eliminated. 
On its surface, the near-extermination of the 
bison appears like other failures of resource 
management in the United States in the nine-
teenth century, when an instrumental eco-
nomic mentality encouraged the unthinking 
depletion of resources. Yet the eradication of 
bison from the Great Plains was not unforeseen, 
but purposeful. In order to pacify the Plains 
Indians, the federal government sought to ex-
terminate the buffalo. As early as the 1830s, 
Indian agents on the upper Missouri River had 
warned that the numbers of bison were declin-
ing precipitously under the pressures of Indian 
and white hunters. 3 The pressure on the herds 
had increased after 1870, when the extension 
of railroads to the Plains and the invention of 
high-powered rifles and refined tanning tech-
nologies improved the marketability of buffalo 
hides. Despite mounting evidence that com-
mercial hunters would soon render the North 
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American bison extinct, state and federal au-
thorities acting on the recommendations of the 
Department of the Interior and the Army did 
not pass protective legislation until after the 
number of buffaloes had been reduced to a few 
hundred-that is, until so few buffaloes re-
mained that nomadic Indians of the Plains 
abandoned the hunt and surrendered to the res-
ervation system. 
Policy makers in the late nineteenth century 
accepted the extermination of bison as both 
reasonable and natural. Omar Conger, a mem-
ber of Congress from Michigan, looked upon 
protective legislation as "utterly useless." Dur-
ing Congressional debate in 1874 he said, "There 
is no law that Congress can pass that will pre-
vent the buffalo disappearing before the march 
of civilization." Yet at the time of the Louisiana 
Purchase to countenance the extermination of 
a species was unthinkable. Writing in 1787 
Thomas Jefferson expressed his belief that the 
mammoth, the buffalo's prehistoric analogue, 
was not extinct but could be found in the North 
American interior. "Such is the economy of 
nature, that no instance can be produced of her 
having permitted anyone race of animals to 
become extinct, of her having formed any link 
in her great work so weak as to be broken."4 
The extinction of the bison, thought to be im-
possible in 1803, was considered inevitable at 
the end of the century. 
Between the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and 
the virtual extinction of the North American 
bison in 1883, prevailing interpretations of na-
ture, Indians, and commerce conditioned eco-
nomic and environmental regulation of the 
Great Plains. In the Jeffersonian era, most 
Americans thought nature was orderly, har-
monious, and benevolent. They perceived Na-
tive Americans as noble savages who lived in 
spartan, egalitarian simplicity. Late eighteenth-
century political economy sought to balance 
economic interests, maintain stability, and con-
trol economic development. The federal Indian 
factory system, which regulated the fur trade in 
the United States between 1795 and 1822, was 
a legal codification of this mechanistic world-
view. The factory system incorporated Indians, 
whites, and the natural environment into a sta-
ble, balanced system of regulated trade. 
Beginning in the 1830s, however, a new par-
adigm shaped economic and environmental reg-
ulation of the Plains, a paradigm that emphasized 
conflict and competition. Most midcentury 
Americans believed nature to be turbulent and 
competitive. They saw Indians not as noble sav-
ages but as an inferior racial stock fated for 
extinction. They viewed the market not as an 
engine of equality, but as a trial that selected 
the fittest for survival. Similarly, the American 
legal order was transformed in the nineteenth 
century. By midcentury the legal system that 
had once mandated community harmony and 
economic stability advocated unleashing eco-
nomic competition and opening natural re-
sources to economic development. 5 This 
Darwinian world view influenced lawmakers to 
facilitate the subjugation of the plains nomads 
and to open the market for the extermination 
of buffaloes; it sanctioned such actions as the 
survival of the biological and economic fittest. 6 
The shift from one dominant paradigm to 
another was not an absolute change, nor did 
other views of Indians or nature disappear. Al-
though the dominant view of nature and In-
dians in the eighteenth century was of an orderly 
environment populated by noble savages, some 
Americans saw nature as a howling wilderness 
and Indians as Hobbesian brutes. Likewise, de-
spite the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm 
in the mid-nineteenth century, the myth of the 
noble savage re-emerged in nineteenth-century 
literature. 7 Dominant worldviews did not force 
all Americans into intellectual lockstep; rather, 
they were widespread attitudes and assumptions 
that guided political and economic decisions. 
In Jefferson's time, most people in the En-
glish-speaking world believed that nature was 
orderly and benign. That belief was a legacy of 
eighteenth-century students of nature like the 
Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus and the 
French naturalist Georges Louis LeClerc, the 
Comte de Buffon. Linnaeus and Buffon, the 
founders of modem natural history, saw in na-
ture an integrated order and benevolent plen-
itude. They classified thousands of plants and 
animals according to fixed categories and de-
scribed nature as an immutable "system of laws." 
The natural order of Linnaeus and Buffon was 
stable, harmonious, and regular: the circulation 
of water from rainfall to rivers to oceans to 
rainfall again; the cycle of the seasons; the sub-
sistence of plants upon the soil, animals upon 
plants, carnivores upon their prey, and hunters 
upon game. In North America, this mechan-
istic view of nature dominated. American nat-
uralists such as Manasseh Cutler, Humphrey 
Marshall, John and William Bartram, Charles 
Willson Peale, Benjamin Smith Barton, and 
Alexander Garden incorporated New World 
flora and fauna into the Linnaean system of 
classification. Likewise, American landscape 
painter Washington Allston depicted the 
American countryside as a· pastoral Arcadia. 
Consistent with a Deistic theology, most Amer-
icans in the late eighteenth century saw nature 
as a well-oiled machine designed to provide for 
humanity. 8 
Just as the late eighteenth-century worldview 
imposed order and benevolence upon the en-
vironment, it attributed similar qualities to "na-
ture's children," Native Americans. The ideal 
of the noble savage, "unburdened by social con-
ventions, sometimes toughened by a puritan 
simplicity, limited in his requirements, and 
content in a world that demanded nothing of 
him," dominated Jeffersonian America. J. Hec-
tor St. John de Crevecoeur, in Letters from an 
American Farmer, first published in 1782, con-
tended that Indians "live without care, sleep 
without inquietude, take life as it comes, bear-
ing all its asperities with unparalleled patience. 
. . . They most certainly are much more closely 
connected to Nature than we are; they are her 
immediate children."9 The image of the noble 
savage persisted in American portraiture until 
the 1830s in the serene and aloof figures in the 
works of Charles Bird King and George Catlin. 10 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury, Indians, like nature, were presumed to be 
essentially static, orderly, and benign. 
POLICY OF DESTRUCTION 229 
The ideals of the benevolent environment 
and the noble savage were part of the same 
system of thought that included Jeffersonian po-
litical economy. Late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century political and economic ide-
ology centered around conflictive ideas about 
commerce. For the most part, Americans of 
Jefferson's generation welcomed commercial ac-
tivity as a harmonizing force. The widespread, 
rational pursuit of property, according to late 
eighteenth-century liberal ideology, insured 
against the aggregation of wealth in the hands 
of an aristocracy. At the same time, adherents 
to republican ideals harbored considerable mis-
givings about the effect of excessive commerce 
on republican government. Jeffersonians prized 
economic independence as the source of the 
civic virtue necessary to representative govern-
ment. Only self-sufficient citizens, like yeoman 
farmers, could be expected to detach their pri-
vate interests from the public good. "Corrup-
tion of morals in the mass of cultivators," 
Jefferson wrote in 1787, "is a phenomenon of 
which no age nor nation has furnished an ex-
ample." Unchecked commercial activity, be-
cause it discouraged simple needs and self-
sufficiency, and instead encouraged luxury and 
vice, threatened to undermine republican vir-
tue. To forestall this fate, republicans hoped to 
arrest American economic development at the 
commercial agrarian stage. Indeed, Jefferson 
hoped that the Louisiana Purchase would pro-
vide enough land to insure that the United States 
would always be a nation of independent farm-
ers. l1 
Jeffersonian views of nature, Indians, and 
political economy depended upon many com-
mon assumptions. Stability and harmony fig-
ured importantly in the late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century worldview. Nature op-
erated according to unchanging laws, Indians 
existed in a perpetual state of harmony with the 
environment, and an agrarian democracy, Jef-
ferson and others hoped, would form a stable, 
everlasting republic. Likewise, both nature and 
economy functioned according to rational stric-
tures. In all, the mechanistic view of nature, 
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the ideal of the noble savage, and Jeffersonian 
political economy bore the imprint oflate eight-
eenth- and early nineteenth-century conscious-
ness: stability, harmony, order, benevolence, 
and rationality. 
Jeffersonian culture shaped economic and 
environmental regulation and Indian policy in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury. The Jeffersonian suspicion of commerce, 
with its attendant ideal of stability, was evident 
in Congress's enactment of the Indian Factory 
Act in 1795. The system provided for the li-
censing of private traders of good moral char-
acter and the establishment of federally owned 
trading posts, or factories. In exchange for furs, 
the factories provided Indians with goods at cost. 
Because they sought only to meet their ex-
penses, the factories hoped to undersell private 
vendors and force them out of the fur trade. 
John Mason, the first superintendent of the fac-
tory system, believed that private traders were 
persons "of desperate character, who are de-
basing the habits of the Indians-and at the 
same time cheating them of their little earnings 
by constantly dealing out to them spirituous 
liquors." John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War 
under President James Monroe, was particularly 
concerned about the effect of private trade in 
the newly acquired Louisiana Territory, "the 
best region for furs and peltries on this conti-
nent." He wrote in 1818 that unregulated com-
merce in furs on the Great Plains would be 
disastrous. "Each trader, or association of trad-
ers, would endeavor to monopolize the trade 
within certain limits, and would exert their cun-
ning and influence to render the savages their 
partisans, and the enemy of their rivals in trade. 
. . . A state of disorder and violence would 
universally prevail." For these reasons Jefferson 
commended the purpose of the factory system 
to "undersell private traders, ... drive them 
from the competition," and thus, win "the 
goodwill of the Indians. "12 
T urn-of-the-century Jeffersonians believed 
that well-regulated commerce would pacify and 
civilize Indians; an unregulated market in furs 
would bring out the worst characteristics of both 
Indians and whites. Thus they proposed to cre-
ate a system that would bring order and stability 
to the fur trade. Like the late eighteenth-cen-
tury mechanistic vision of nature, the factory 
system incorporated disparate elements into a 
coherent whole. It was designed to function like 
a well-oiled machine, stabilizing the interests 
of white traders, Indian hunters, and fur-bear-
ing game. 13 
Between 1795 and 1808, all the federal trad-
ing posts were east of the Mississippi River. By 
1808, however, private traders had opened the 
commerce in furs west of the Mississippi, and 
the trade in the East had declined precipitously 
as Indian and white hunters exhausted supplies 
of fur-bearing game. In that year, the Office of 
Indian Trade established a new factory in the 
Great Plains. The new post, Fort Osage, was 
located 330 miles up the Missouri River from 
St. Louis, at the mouth of the Kansas River. 
The villages of the Osages, Kansas, Otoes, and 
Pawnees were located in the region near the 
factory. These riverine yillagers of the eastern 
Great Plains spent roughly half the year in their 
settlements, where the women planted com, 
beans, melons, and squash and the men hunted 
the deer, elk, and small mammals found in the 
river valleys. In the summer months, the In-
dians abandoned their villages for the High 
Plains, where they hunted buffalo from horse-
back. In the autumn, they returned to their 
villages to harvest their crops. The production 
of the village was shared widely; bonds of kin-
ship enjoined the fortunate to provide for the 
destitute. 14 Between the various tribes, ex-
change cemented peaceful relations. In order 
to insure a "market peace," villagers extended 
ties of "fictive kinship" to commercial visitors. IS 
The factor at Fort Osage, George C. Sibley, 
was devoted to the goal of a well-regulated In-
dian trade. He attributed most Indian attacks 
on whites to the rapacity of private traders: 
The extortion [sic) of the traders are always 
so exorbitant that 'tis not at all surprising 
that the Indians sometimes resort to robbery. 
In truth, the most of the difficulties that arise 
between the Indians and the whites may be 
traced to this very cause. The Factory System 
as established by Jefferson, was designed to 
obviate this end, and to a great extent it has 
had that effect. 
Sibley contended that the Kansas "are now 
undergoing a Reformation," under "the pow-
erful influence of a better regulated Trade. " The 
Kansas increasingly brought their deerskins, 
beaver pelts, and buffalo tallow to Fort Osage, 
where they obtained goods "at prices less than 
half what the traders extort from them. "16 The 
Osages also ceased their hostilities against whites 
after the establishment of the trading post. 
Accordingly, Fort Osage was a busy post. 
Between November 1807 and September 1811, 
the Office of Indian Trade supplied Fort Osage 
with merchandise worth $25,539, more than 
any other factory in the system. 17 Although trade 
was interrupted during the War of 1812, the 
post ranked as the most productive trading site 
in the factory system in 1817 and 1819. 18 The 
Kansas, Pawnees, Otoes, and Osages traded their 
furs at Fort Osage rather than with private trad-
ing outfits because they received more goods for 
their pelts. At Fort Osage, Sibley added twenty-
five percent to the value of the factory's goods 
to cover the costs of transportation and the 
maintenance of the post. The prices at Fort 
Osage therefore compared quite favorably with 
those of private trading outfits, which often sold 
their goods to Indians at 300 to 400 percent of 
their value. 
In 1811, Sibley estimated that a trader with 
three thousand dollars worth of merchandise 
could in one season exchange those goods for 
ten to twenty-five packs of furs weighing one 
hundred pounds each. In St. Louis, the trader 
could sell those furs for eight to twelve thousand 
dollars.19 Indeed, private traders had bilked 
Plains Indians of their furs since the late eight-
eenth century. Between 1788 and 1803, St. 
Louis trading outfits annually garnered about 
$200,000 worth of furs from the Plains tribes. 
In return, they sent about $60,000 worth of 
merchandise up the Missouri. 10 Because the In-
dians received more merchandise for their goods 
at Fort Osage, they could supply themselves 
with manufactured goods at the cost of fewer 
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pelts. The factories thus discouraged the kind 
of overhunting that private traders engendered. 
In addition to discouraging overhunting, Fort 
Osage adapted its operations to the ceremonial 
aspects of Indian intertribal exchange. The fac-
tors sought not to profit from the fur trade but 
to gain the Indians' good will. John Mason wrote 
to Sibley in 1808, "The principle object of the 
government in these establishments being to 
secure the Friendship of the Indians in our 
country. . . let every transaction with them be 
conducted as to inspire them with full confi-
dence in its honor, integrity, and good faith 
. . . . IBle conciliatory in all your intercourse 
with the Indians, and so demean yourself toward 
them generally and toward their chiefs in par-
ticular as to obtain and preserve their Friendship 
and to secure their attachment to the United 
States. "II For the Indians and for the Office of 
Indian Trade, exchanges served to facilitate and 
formalize friendship and alliance. 
Proponents of the dependency theory of de-
velopment and underdevelopment have argued 
that the United States established the factories 
to render Indians dependent on the federal gov-
ernment. zz There is some evidence for this idea: 
in 1803, Jefferson suggested to William Henry 
Harrison that the government factories would 
"be glad to see the good and influential Indians 
among them run into debt, because we observe 
that when these debts get beyond what the in-
dividual can pay, they become willing to lop 
them off by a cession of land." Despite Jeffer-
son's musings, it seems unlikely that the factory 
system was designed to reduce Indians to de-
pendence. Jefferson did not equate Indians' ces-
sion of lands with their economic 
marginalization. He believed that once Indians 
adopted techniques of intensive cultivation, they 
would no longer need to manage extensive 
hunting territories. "A single farm," he wrote, 
"will show more of cattle, than a whole country 
. . . can of buffaloes. "13 
Indeed, the Osages regarded the factory not 
as an instrument to defraud them of their lands 
but as an institution designed to insulate them 
from the rapacity of St. Louis traders. In 1808, 
when the Osages agreed to cede territory to the 
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United States, it was not because they had run 
themselves into debt at the factory. In fact, they 
insisted that the federal government continue 
to maintain the post as one of the conditions 
of the treaty. Moreover, had it wished to ruin 
the Indians with credit, the federal government 
could have delivered them into the hands of 
private fur traders. Yet the factories were de-
signed to eliminate credit, the profit motive, 
ruinous competition, and disreputable charac-
ters from the fur trade. The factory system was 
an attempt to promote peace with Indians 
through regulated commerce. 
Yet Jeffersonian political economy main-
tained conflicting notions of commerce; it was 
both a source of corruption and a mechanism 
for equality and harmony. The factory system 
adhered to both ideas, and this internal con-
tradiction eventually proved to be the system's 
downfall. From their inception in 1795, the 
factories tried to eliminate "Fraud, Trick, or 
deception" from the fur trade.24 At the same 
time, in the interest of equal economic oppor-
tunity, federal Indian agents continued to li-
cense private fur traders. Although licensed to 
deal in the Great Lakes woodlands, private trad-
ing outfits carted their trade goods to the north-
ern Great Plains where beaver and bison were 
plentiful. 25 Private traders not only defrauded 
Indians of their furs, but dealt liquor and ex-
tended credit to them, which stimulated ov-
erhunting and depleted supplies of fur-bearing 
game. "Our Indians," wrote Thomas L. Mc-
Kenney, who became superintendent of Indian 
trade in 1816, "owe much of their misery to the 
half-way policy of the government. "26 Within 
the various bureaus of the federal government 
that managed Indian affairs, condemnation of 
private traders was nearly universal. Yet the 
traders' appeal to equal economic opportunity 
gained strength in the first decades of the nine-
teenth century. In 1821, despite the treaty that 
guaranteed the continuance of the Osage fac-
tory, Congress voted to disband the factory sys-
temY 
The demise of the factory system and of the 
eighteenth-century ideal of natural and com-
mercial stability that it represented was part of 
the reformation of the American legal order in 
the early nineteenth century. The eighteenth-
century concern for an ordered community and 
economic harmony gave way to a nineteenth-
century emphasis on economic liberty. A spirit 
of economic development was ascendant in the 
United States in the early nineteenth century; 
it was accompanied by a changing conception 
of the law.· American law in the late eighteenth 
century had derived largely from the anti-de-
velopmental English common law. Created to 
serve the interests of England's landed gentry, 
the common law had envisioned a static, agrar-
ian conception ofland. Beginning around 1820, 
the United States increasingly discarded com-
mon law principles in favor of instrumental stat-
utes that facilitated the exploitation of public 
lands and natural resources for economic 
growth. 28 Absent from the nineteenth-century 
legal and economic order was the older concern 
for harmony and balance. Quite in contrast to 
earlier customs, after 1820 the law was unlikely 
to uphold the rights of individuals or corpora-
tions with established economic interests if those 
interests stood in the way of economic growth. 
Ironically, while the Jeffersonian concept of 
mixed economic enterprise was undermined by 
the ideal of economic individualism and com-
petition, when the federal and state govern-
ments abandoned economic interventionism in 
the 1820s and 1830s, they opened the field not 
to economic competition but to a handful of 
powerful corporations. The fur trade was par-
ticularly liable to corporate dominance because 
it required a large initial capital investment. 
The most influential of these fur-trading com-
panies was John Jacob Astor's American Fur 
Company, which formed a Western Depart-
ment to exploit the resources of the Upper Mis-
souri in 1822. Thomas McKenney had 
complained in 1818 that the large fur companies 
possessed "a complete ability to keep out of the 
trade all individuals-yet, those very men are 
foremost in the clamour for a privilege for in-
dividual enterprise, whilst they all testify their 
hostility to Government Policy. I wonder how 
many individuals enjoy the benefits of Mr. As-
tor's wide extended, and I may add very fruitful 
trade?"29 
In the decades after 1820, a new understand-
ing of nature accompanied economic expansion 
in the United States. While eighteenth-century 
naturalists had described stability, harmony, and 
order, by the mid-nineteenth century natural-
ists saw in nature instability, turbulence, com-
petition, and change. Charles Darwin wrote in 
The Origin of Species in 1859, 
Nothing is easier than to admit in words the 
truth of the universal struggle for life, or 
more difficult constantly to bear in mind. 
We behold the face of nature bright with 
gladness, we often see superabundance of 
food; we do not see or we forget, that the 
birds which are idly singing round us live 
mostly on insects or seeds, and are thus con-
stantly destroying life; or we forget how largely 
these songsters, or their eggs, or their nest-
lings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of 
prey. 30 
Darwin was not alone in his view of nature 
as "red in tooth and claw." In his 1851 novel 
Moby Dick, Herman Melville depicted nature 
as dark and unfathomable. Romantic landscape 
paintings of the mid-nineteenth century, such 
as George Caleb Bingham's 1850 work The 
Stann, similarly confirmed that nature could be 
turbulent and destructive. Consistent with the 
new legal order that opened up the struggle for 
economic ascent, Americans saw in nature a 
desperate struggle for survival among species and 
among variations of a single species. Eight-
eenth-century naturalists believed that nature 
did not allow a species to change or to die out. 
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, scientists and others came to believe that 
nature made no such provision for the survival 
of the weak; indeed, it sanctioned their ex-
tinction. 
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Likewise, in the mid-nineteenth century most 
white Americans assumed that the expansion 
of the United States at the expense of Native 
Americans was a process of natural selection. 
After 1820 white Americans no longer com-
monly accepted the ideal of the American In-
dian as a noble savage living in primitive purity. 
Instead, they adopted racist, pseudo-scientific 
characterizations of Native Americans as bio-
logical inferiors to whites. Charles Caldwell, a 
professor of natural history trained at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, objected to the eight-
eenth-century notion that Indians were the 
equals, or at least the potential equals, of whites. 
He argued in 1830 that races had been created 
distinct and unequal. Indians, he contended, 
were inferior and therefore destined to die out. 
Physicians like the Philadelphian Samuel George 
Morton drew on pseudo-scientific ideas to argue 
that Indians were biologically deficient. Writ-
ing in 1839, Morton contended that Indians' 
intellectual faculties "appear to be of a decidedly 
inferior cast when compared with those of the 
Caucasian or Mongolian races." No amount of 
education, Morton believed, could improve the 
Indians; they were fated for extinction. 31 
Likewise, Alfred Russel Wallace, who formu-
lated his own theory of natural selection in-
dependent of Darwin, argued in 1864, 
It is the same great law of "the preservation 
of favoured races in the struggle for life" which 
leads to the inevitable extinction of all those 
low and mentally undeveloped populations 
with which Europeans come in contact. The 
red Indian[sJ in North America ... die out, 
not from anyone special cause, but from the 
inevitable effects of an unequal mental and 
physical struggle. 32 
Consistent with this view of Indians as savage 
impediments to progress, mid-century Ameri-
can painters such as Bingham, Seth Eastman, 
Charles Wimar, and Charles Deas depicted In-
dians as skulking, ferocious brutes. 33 
In 1850, the British writer Herbert Spencer 
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lent an aura of providence to the concept of 
the extinction of the American Indians, much 
as Darwin, nine years later, would explain the 
extinction of unfit species as a healthy process 
of natural selection: 
Suffering and death are the penalties at-
tached by nature to ignorance, as well as to 
incompetence .... If there seems harshness 
in such ordinations, be sure it is apparent 
only, and not real. Partly by weeding out 
those of the lowest development and partly 
by subjecting those who remain to the never-
ceasing discipline of experience, nature se-
cures the growth of a race who shall both 
understand the conditions of existence and 
be able to act up to them. 34 
Similarly, political economists in the middle 
of the nineteenth century believed that eco-
nomic competition insured the growth and bet-
terment of American society. Just as nature 
selected the fittest for survival, the operations 
of the market selected the efficient and pro-
ductive for prosperity. The new political econ-
omy no longer esteemed self-sufficiency or 
spartan simplicity but called instead for eco-
nomic specialization, commerce, and compe-
tition. Like Herbert Spencer, mid-century 
political economists argued that the productive 
must replace the inefficient if the United States 
were to prosper. Jeffersonian political econo-
mists had envisioned the incorporation of Na-
tive Americans within a network of regulated 
trade. The new political economists, in con-
trast, viewed the market not as a mechanism 
for harmony, but as a trial to separate the fit 
from the unfit. 35 
Just as Jeffersonian views of nature, Indians, 
and economy had been united by shared as-
sumptions of rationality and harmony, the views 
of nature, Indians, and economy in the middle 
of the nineteenth century also constituted a 
coherent worldview. Underlying the mid-nine-
teenth-century consciousness was a vision of 
atomization and conflict, however. Darwin saw 
in nature an unending "struggle for life" among 
species and varieties of the same species. Polit-
ical economists envisioned a national market 
that pitted all against all. Americans believed 
that, although cruel, the rigors of natural, ra-
cial, and economic competition were benefi-
cial. Biology and the market alike selected the 
strongest for survival. Accompanying the view 
that natural, racial, and economic competition 
worked to the benefit of the whole was the belief 
that extinction was acceptable, perhaps even 
welcome. 
Mid-century regulations bore the imprint of 
the Darwinian consciousness. Once the com-
merce in buffalo robes had been opened to pri-
vate traders with the dissolution of the factory 
system in 1822, the trade operated largely free 
of governmental regulation. The Indian Trade 
and Intercourse Act, passed in 1834, purported 
to regulate commerce with Indians. It stipulated 
that only licensed traders could legally deal with 
Indians, and it outlawed liquor from the trade, 
but it remained largely unenforced. Moreover, 
in 1866, its strictures on Indian trade were lifted 
in an amendment attached to a Bureau of In-
dian Affairs appropriations bill. Like the factory 
system and the 1808 treaty with the Osages, 
the Trade and Intercourse Act was disregarded 
and later discarded in the interest of economic 
development, especially after the discovery of 
gold in Colorado, Montana, and the Black Hills 
between 1859 and 1874. Economic and envi-
ronmental regulation of the Great Plains in the 
mid-nineteenth century thus endeavored to open 
up the region's natural resources to economic 
development at the expense of Native Ameri-
cans, especially the nomads of the western Great 
Plains. 36 
Unlike the village-dwelling Indians of the 
Missouri who had traded their furs at Fort Os-
age, during the nineteenth century the nomads 
of the Great Plains did not combine hunting 
and gathering with agriculture but instead relied 
almost entirely on the buffalo. Yet before the 
mid-eighteenth century these nomads--among 
them the Arapahoes, Atsinas, Cheyennes, 
Crows, and Sioux-had combined planting with 
summer migrations to the High Plains to hunt 
bison. Likewise, the Assiniboines and Blackfeet 
had spent much of the year hunting and gath-
ering in the woodland-prairie border zone of 
Canada, and the Comanches and Kiowas had 
hunted and gathered in the Great Basin and 
Rocky Mountains. These tribes had similarly 
migrated to the Plains in the summer to hunt 
buffaloes. The Indians' former reliance on more 
than one resource had been a conscious land-
use strategy, a system of ecological "safety nets. " 
Economic specialization was dangerous, but by 
gathering and hunting as well as planting, or 
by gleaning their subsistence from two or more 
ecosystems, Indians could survive poor hunts or 
crop failures. 37 
In the eighteenth century, in response to the 
European economic and ecological conquest of 
North America, the tribes that would become 
the nomadic Plains Indians abandoned their 
ecological "safety nets" to concentrate on 
equestrian buffalo hunting. The horses that Eu-
ropeans had introduced allowed the Indians to 
adapt their movements to the migrations of the 
buffalo herds. At the same time, European dis-
eases turned Indian villages into deathtraps. 
Faced with outbreaks of smallpox and measles, 
a number of village tribes in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century abandoned settled ag-
riculture and become nomads. In addition, the 
lure of trade with Europeans induced many tribes 
to abandon planting to concentrate on the pro-
curement of beaver pelts and buffalo robes. 38 
Although plains nomads were indomitable, their 
livelihood rested almost entirely on the bison. 
After the Civil War, when the federal govern-
ment sought to confine the nomads to reser-
vations, their specialized economy and narrow 
ecological foundation proved to be a grave li-
ability. 
Before 1830 white fur traders found that the 
profitable market was in beaver pelts, yet Plains 
Indians sent about 5000 buffalo robes each year 
to St. Louis. Commerce in buffalo robes ex-
panded after 1830, once the strictures of the 
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factory system had been lifted and plains beavers 
had been hunted out. From 1840 until the 1870s, 
plains nomads traded more than 100,000 robes 
each year to Missouri River merchants. 39 The 
opening of the market in buffalo robes hastened 
the commercialization of Plains Indian culture 
and led to increasingly heavy pressure on buffalo 
herds. In the 1830s the western Sioux relocated 
from the Missouri River to the upper Platte 
River region to exploit remaining herds. By the 
1850s, when the upper Platte had been stripped 
of bison, these bands of the Sioux along with 
the Cheyennes began to pressure the Crows' 
herds in the Powder River region. The Blackfeet 
increased the size of their buffalo corrals to max-
imize the production of robes. Blackfoot hunters 
took more wives, and women's age of first mar-
riage fell, as Blackfoot women were pressed into 
service to dress robes for trade. As the Blackfeet 
expanded their efforts to produce robes, they 
stopped making their own clothing, pottery, 
and baskets, preferring to trade for goods man-
ufactured by whites. 40 
In the early nineteenth century, the factory 
system had adapted to the aboriginal Plains gift 
economy and discouraged overhunting. With 
the breakdown of the system, both Indian and 
Euroamerican societies shifted from sustainable 
resource strategies to exploitative, market-ori-
ented economic regimes. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the changing American le-
gal and economic order had helped to transform 
Plains Indian societies into market-driven so-
cieties. Under the pressure of the market, plains 
nomads began to hunt the bison into extinc-
tion. Decades before white hunters, armed with 
powerful, accurate rifles, delivered the coup de 
grace to the herds, plains nomads' exploitation 
of the bison for trade had already proved to be 
unsustainable. 41 
The federal government did not fail to notice 
the plains nomads' increasing dependence on 
the diminishing herds. As early as 1837, Indian 
agents in the Plains noted the scarcity of buf-
falo. Thereafter, references to the mounting 
desperation of the nomads were included in 
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nearly every annual report of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs. One agent reported that in 
1846 the scarcity of buffalo near the Missouri 
River reduced the Assiniboines to cannibal-
ism.42 A few agents urged the government to 
adopt a policy of humanity, but many saw the 
destruction of the herds as a means of pacifi-
cation. Columbus Delano, the Secretary of the 
Interior between 1870 and 1875, summed up 
the potential benefits of the destruction of the 
bison in his annual report for 1872: 
The rapid disappearance of game from the 
former hunting-grounds must operate largely 
in favor of our efforts to confine the Indians 
to smaller areas, and compel them to aban-
don their nomadic customs. . . . So long as 
the game existed in abundance there was 
little disposition manifested to abandon the 
chase. 43 
Texas Representative James W. Throckmor-
ton echoed Delano's views in 1876, saying, 
there is no question that so long as there are 
millions of buffaloes in the West, so long the 
Indians cannot be controlled, even by the 
strong arm of the Government. I believe that 
it would be a great step forward in the civ-
ilization of the Indians and the preservation 
of peace on the border if there was not a 
buffalo in existence. 44 
At the same time that the federal government 
adopted a policy of ecological destruction, white 
hunters began to press the herds to extinction. 
Their entry into the business of buffalo hunting 
accompanied the extension of railroads into the 
southern Plains, which facilitated the shipment 
of hides to eastern markets. Improved tanning 
technologies made summer hides marketable and 
meant year-round pressure on the herds. The 
marketability of summer hides and the eco-
nomic depression of 1873 that threw railroad 
construction laborers in the southern Plains out 
of work combined to drive hundreds of white 
hunters into the field. Between 1872 and 1874, 
white hunters in the southern Plains shipped 
1.3 million buffalo hides east. 45 
Lawmakers in the southern Plains followed 
the advice of the Secretary of the Interior and 
other advocates of destruction. A bill in the 
Kansas state legislature outlawing the "wanton 
slaughter of the buffalo" was vetoed in 1872. 
The next year, the Texas state legislature con-
sidered a similar bill. General Philip Sheridan, 
stationed in San Antonio, reportedly told the 
legislature in Austin that the hide hunters 
have done more in the last two years, and 
will do more in the next year, to settle the 
vexed Indian question than the entire regular 
army has done in the last thirty years. They 
are destroying the Indians' commissary; and 
it is a well-known fact that an army losing 
its base of supplies is placed at a great dis-
advantage. Send them powder and lead, if 
you will; but, for the sake of lasting peace, 
let them kill, skin and sell until the buffaloes 
are exterminated. 46 
Some members of Congress believed that the 
policy of destruction was counterproductive; it 
merely drove desperate Indians to acts of vio-
lence. "I am not in favor of civilizing the Indian 
by starving him to death," Representative 
Greenbury Fort of Illinois said. In 1874 and 
1876, Fort introduced resolutions banning com-
mercial buffalo hunting in the Indian territo-
ries. In opposition, Ohio Representative and 
future President James Garfield cited the rec-
ommendations of the secretary of the interior 
and asked, "whether the very processes of civ-
ilization are not in their own course sweeping 
away the ground upon which Indian barbarism 
plants itself?"47 The 1874 bill passed both houses 
of Congress but was vetoed by President Ulysses 
S. Grant. In 1876, Fort's bill passed in the House 
but was stalled in a Senate committee. Indian 
policy, in effect, was to allow the market in 
buffalo hides to proceed unfettered. Lawmakers 
acquiesced to a Darwinian worldview that sanc-
tioned the subjugation of Indians and the ex-
termination of buffaloes as "natural." 
While the secretary of the interior and the 
Department of the Army persuaded governors, 
the Senate, and the President to allow the hide 
hunters' eradication of the herds to continue, 
Army officers in the Plains encouraged white 
hunters to destroy the "Indians' commissary." 
As early as 1867, Sir William F. Butler, a British 
officer, confessed to u.S. Army Col. Richard 
I. Dodge that he had shot more than thirty 
buffaloes on the North Platte. "I could not but 
feel some qualms of conscience at the thought 
of the destruction of so much animal life, but 
Col. Dodge held different views. 'Kill every buf-
falo you can,' he said; 'every buffalo dead is an 
Indian gone. "'48 During the height of the 
slaughter of the southern herd, Dodge was re-
sponsible for keeping hide hunters from crossing 
the Arkansas River and hunting on its southern 
bank, designated the exclusive hunting territory 
of the Southern Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Co-
manches, and Kiowas in the Treaties of Med-
icine Lodge in October, 1867.49 
Nonetheless, Dodge did not prevent white 
hunters from entering the Indians' preserve. In 
1873 he reportedly told Josiah Wright Mooar, 
the head of the largest hide hunting outfit in 
the southern Plains, "If I were a buffalo hunter, 
I would hunt where the buffaloes are." In 1868 
General William T. Sherman, a member of 
Grant's peace commission to the Sioux, Chey-
ennes, and Arapahoes, and signatory to the 
Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, had conceded 
to the plains nomads "a right to hunt buffaloes 
as long as they last." Yet Sherman wrote to his 
brother, aU. S. Senator from Ohio, that "it will 
not be long before all the buffaloes are ex-
tinct. "50 Like the factory system, the treaties of 
1867 and 1868 purported to restrain the ex-
ploitation of natural resources and preserve them 
for Native Americans. They were ignored by a 
midcentury legal order that overrode laws de-
signed to control economic development and 
overlooked the social and ecological costs of 
economic growth. 
The slaughter, therefore, continued un-
abated, moving from the southern Plains to the 
north. The hides were shipped east by rail and, 
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because buffalo leather is highly elastic, used to 
make belts to drive industrial machinery. When 
the buffaloes had been hunted out by 1883, 
homesteaders and Indians scavenged the Plains 
for their bones, which were sold to railroads for 
delivery to sugar refineries or fertilizer plants. 
In less than one hundred years, the most prom-
inent resource of the Plains had been ground 
down to its salable parts and incorporated into 
the emerging American industrial system. Once 
the herds were eradicated, plains nomads were 
forced to go to reservations. Commerce, which 
Americans thought would be the Plains' engine 
of harmony in 1803, had become by 1883 an 
engine of destruction and impoverishment. 
During the nineteenth century, American com-
merce was transformed from an agent of peace 
to an agent of conquest. 
Underlying the American extermination of 
the bison in the 1870s and early 1880s was an 
ecological irony. In terms of resource manage-
ment, by the mid-nineteenth century the plains 
nomads shared important similarities with their 
contemporaries in United States society. Like 
the American industrial economy that relied on 
the unsustainable use of natural resources, no-
madic societies had come to rely overmuch on 
a narrow ecological foundation, the buffalo 
herds. Like the emerging industrial society of 
the United States, which felled trees and mined 
coal and iron ore at an alarming rate, the In-
dians' subsistence was based on the exploitation 
of nature. In Americans' understanding, the 
plains nomads' reliance on the buffalo was the 
weakness of a primitive society. Yet when Amer-
icans slaughtered the buffaloes to pacify the 
Plains Indians they did not exploit the peculiar 
weakness of savages; when they capitalized on 
the plains nomads' ecological Achilles heel they 
exposed the fragility of all societies, including 
their own, that rely on the unsustainable ex-
ploitation of nature. 
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